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This paper reports on various aspects of the Intelligent Vehicle Systems (IVS) team’s in-
volvement in the recent 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge, wherein our platform, the au-
tonomous “XAV-250,” competed as one of the 11 finalists qualifying for the event. We
provide a candid discussion of the hardware and software design process that led to our
team’s entry, along with lessons learned at this event and derived from participation in the
two previous Grand Challenges. In addition, we give an overview of our vision-, radar-,
and LIDAR-based perceptual sensing suite, its fusion with a military-grade inertial nav-
igation package, and the map-based control and planning architectures used leading up
to and during the event. The underlying theme of this article is to elucidate how the de-
velopment of future automotive safety systems can potentially be accelerated by tackling
the technological challenges of autonomous ground vehicle robotics. Of interest, we will
discuss how a production manufacturing mindset imposes a unique set of constraints
upon approaching the problem and how this worked for and against us, given the very
compressed timeline of the contests. C© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The narrative presented in this paper is derived from
experiences gained by the various authors through
their participation in the series of DARPA Grand
Challenges (DGC1, DGC2, DGC3, also variously re-
ferred to by year, etc.). During the inaugural edition
of the Grand Challenge, two of the authors worked
as volunteers for DARPA and performed tasks such
as reviewing the participating teams’ technical pro-
posals, conducting safety evaluations of the entrants’
robots, and serving as chase vehicle crew members.
In the process, they were able to gain insight into
the state of the art of ground vehicle robotics and
established an invaluable array of personal contacts,
ranging from government officials to university re-
searchers to corporate manufacturers. By the end of
the event, the consensus was that many of the prob-
lems that were vexing ground vehicle robotics were
of the same technological nature as the hurdles im-
peding the rapid development of advanced safety
systems in the automotive industry.
With this conclusion in mind, in 2005 a col-
laborative effort was formed between Delphi, Ford,
Honeywell, and PercepTek, with the goal of con-
ducting joint research directed toward the creation of
safe and robust intelligent ground vehicle systems for
production-intent commercial and military applica-
tions. Participating under the collaborative name “In-
telligent Vehicle Safety Technologies,” or IVST, they
entered the 2005 DGC, fielding the autonomous Ford
F-250 dubbed the “Desert Tortoise.” In their first at-
tempt at ground vehicle robotics, the team impres-
sively made it all the way through the selection pro-
cess, earning the fifth starting pole position at the fi-
nals (IVST, 2005a, 2005b).
Upon announcement of the 2007 DARPA Urban
Challenge (DUC/DGC3), three core members from
the previous effort formed a new collaboration, this
time known as “Intelligent Vehicle Systems” (IVS),
which was initially composed primarily of employ-
ees from Delphi, Ford, and Honeywell. However, as
the project evolved, the collaboration expanded to
include contributions from a variety of external or-
ganizations, including Cybernet, the University of
Michigan (UMich), and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT). The team once again used the
F-250 as its base platform, but significant modifi-
cations were made to the sensing suite and com-
puting architecture. The “XAV-250” (eXperimental
Autonomous Vehicle-250) as it was now called, might
Figure 1. The XAV-250 poses for the camera at the 2007
NQE.
seem to be a surprising choice for an urban driving
environment, given its size and mass, and particu-
larly given that its long wheel base resulted in a turn-
ing radius in excess of 8 m (Figure 1). However, the
truck had already proved its merits in the DGC2 and
moreover precisely represents the type of vehicle that
would likely be employed in a realistic autonomous
mission capable of carrying any sort of significant
cargo. If humans could keep it centered in their lane
on the road, we saw no reason to believe that com-
puters could not do the same. The team was one of
only 11 to achieve the finals and one of only six to
have appeared consecutively in the past two DGC fi-
nal events.
It should be noted that the striking difference be-
tween the first Grand Challenges and the latest is the
dynamic nature of the urban event, which introduced
moving targets, intermittently blocked pathways,
and extended navigation in regions of denied-global
positioning system (GPS) reception. The team’s in-
tent was to build upon the lessons learned from the
Desert Tortoise and specifically to evolve from a re-
active, arbiter-based methodology to an architecture
that dynamically senses the three-dimensional (3D)
world about the vehicle and performs complex, real-
time path planning through a dense global obstacle
map populated from multiple types of fused sensor
inputs.
The remainder of this article is organized as
follows. In Section 2 we parallel how advances
in ground robotics research can lead to advances
in automotive active safety applications, thereby
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motivating our corporate research participation in
the DARPA challenges. In Section 3 we provide an
overview of the hardware and software architecture
in place prior to our post-DARPA-site-visit redesign,
which entailed a migration to the MIT software archi-
tecture (described in Section 4). Section 5 reviews our
performance during the National Qualifying Event
(NQE) and Finals, and Section 6 offers a post-DGC re-
flection on engineering lessons learned through our
participation. Finally, Section 7 provides some con-
cluding remarks.
2. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ROBOTICS
RESEARCH AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY
In common with participants in other long-term, vi-
sionary research projects, we are often asked to ex-
plain the relevance of our work. The question of “just
how does playing with robots deliver benefits to the
company, its stakeholders, and customers?” is not un-
common. Our opinion is that by solving the com-
plex challenges required to make a vehicle capable of
autonomous driving, we will simultaneously enable
and accelerate the development of technologies that
will eventually be found on future accident mitiga-
tion and avoidance systems throughout the industry.
As we will discuss later in the text, we do not
anticipate that mass-production, fully autonomous
automobiles (autonomobiles) will appear on the mar-
ket anytime in the foreseeable near future. However,
we do envision a steady and systematic progression
of improvements in automotive convenience, assis-
tance, and safety features, wherein the vehicle be-
comes capable of assuming an ever-increasing role in
the shared human–machine driving experience. The
general trend in the automotive industry is evolv-
ing from merely providing value-added driver in-
formation to assisting with mundane driving tasks,
warning and helping the driver to choose a safe solu-
tion when presented with potential hazards, and ulti-
mately assuming increasing control when it becomes
indisputably determined that the driver is incapable
of avoiding or mitigating an imminent accident on his
own accord.
The bulleted list below provides a generic
overview of several of the upcoming features be-
ing touted by automotive OEMs (original equipment
manufacturers) and which will undoubtedly bene-
fit from many of the algorithms derived from au-
tonomous vehicle research. Roughly speaking, the
first four examples fall under the categories of brak-
ing, throttle, steering, and vehicle dynamics. The end
point for each of these evolutionary systems con-
verges with the others to provide a comprehensive
collision mitigation strategy. The remaining items on
the list involve infrastructure and human–machine
interactions.
• antilock brake systems (ABS), imminent col-
lision warning, panic brake assist, collision
mitigation by braking (CMbB)
• cruise control, adaptive cruise control (ACC),
ACC plus stop-and-go capability, urban
cruise control (UCC; recognizes stop signs
and traffic signals)
• lane departure warning (LDW), lane keep-
ing assistance (LKA), electronic power as-
sist steering (EPAS), adaptive front steering
(AFS), active steer (EPAS + AFS), emergency
lane assist (ELA)
• traction control, electronic stability control
(ESC), roll stability control (RSC), active sus-
pension
• integration of precrash sensing with occupant
protection equipment (airbags, seat belts,
pretensioners)
• collision mitigation by integrated braking,
throttle, steering, and vehicle dynamics
control
• vehicle-to-vehicle and infrastructure integra-
tion (VII/V-V), intelligent vehicle highway
systems (IVHS)
• blind spot detection, pedestrian detection,
parking assistance, night vision
• driver drowsiness and distraction monitor-
ing
• total accident avoidance/autonomous vehicle
control
2.1. The magnitude of the problem
Although we are frequently reminded of the an-
nual impact to society caused by vehicular accidents
(NHTSA, 2005), it is nevertheless worth summarizing
the statistics for the United States (worldwide statis-
tics, although less well documented, are more than an
order of magnitude worse):
• 43,000 deaths
• 2.7 million injuries
• $230 billion in economic costs
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Figure 2. Distribution of light vehicle crashes by type
(Volpe, 2007).
To put this in perspective, this is roughly the equiva-
lent of one major airline crash per day. Although we
somehow seem to accept the inevitability of traffic ac-
cidents, it is quite unlikely that the American pub-
lic would board airplanes if they knew one of them
would crash every day, killing all occupants aboard.
Figure 2 shows a distribution of light vehicle
crashes by type, as compiled in “Pre-Crash Scenario
Typology for Crash Avoidance Research” (Volpe,
2007). Whereas many of these scenarios are well un-
derstood and safety systems are either in place or
under development to address them, a noteworthy
percentage of the crash scenarios are presently not
well covered by emerging near- to midterm auto-
motive safety technologies. To expand a bit upon
this point, the rear-end collision prevention sce-
nario is the closest to production deployment, be-
cause the bulk of the hardware and algorithms re-
quired to achieve this application are logical exten-
sions of ACC systems, which are presently available
on selected OEM models. Whereas the off-road and
crossing path scenarios, which comprise the largest
share of unresolved safety challenges, could benefit
greatly from the results of the DGC research efforts,
solutions to these issues could be developed even
faster if technologies that were explicitly omitted
from the DGCs were incorporated, notably vehicle-
to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communica-
tions and enhanced roadway maps replete with
ample metadata. We conclude that there are ample
research opportunities for delivering improvements
in automotive safety to members of our society, and
it can be argued that these gaps in coverage obvi-
ously represent scenarios that require a greater de-
gree of situational awareness of the world around the
vehicle, advanced sensors, and more sophisticated
algorithms.
2.2. How Does the Reliability of a Present-Day
Robot Compare with That of a Human?
Before we can make any sort of intelligent comments
about the impending appearance of the autonomo-
biles that popular science writers have been promis-
ing for the past half century (e.g., Figure 3) or, for
that matter, any number of the advanced active safety
features enumerated in the bulleted list above, we
need to have a rough idea of how the performance
of present-day autonomous vehicles compares with
that of human drivers. Given that the primary aim
of this paper is not to scientifically analyze robotic
Figure 3. Yesterday’s “cars of tomorrow.” A couple of fairly typical concept cars from the dawning of the Space Age:
photograph of the 1961 Ford Gyron (left) and preproduction sketch of the 1954 Ford FX-Atmos (right).
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safety but rather to discuss our experiences at the
2007 DARPA Urban Challenge, we present instead
a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation, which serves to
initiate the discussions to follow.
For small distances, we can assume that the prob-
ability of a “failure” is approximately given by
Pf ≈ α δx,
where α is the mean failure rate per distance and δx
is the incremental distance traveled. Conversely, the
probability of “success” is given by
Ps = 1 − Pf .
If we wish to repeatedly achieve success and note that
the total distance traveled is simply x = n δx, where n
is the number of path segments (i.e., trials), then the
overall probability becomes







Of course, this derivation makes some simplifying
assumptions, most notably that the events are ran-
domly distributed and independent of one another
so that they can be modeled as a Poisson process. If,
for example, our vehicle operated flawlessly except
whenever a train passed by, this equation would un-
doubtedly fail to hold. Nevertheless, it makes a good
starting point for a provocative discussion.
If we examine the most recently published data
from NHTSA’s “Traffic Safety Facts 2005” (NHTSA,
2005), we observe that there are roughly
3.0 × 1012 miles driven per year, and
2.0 × 108 registered drivers, translating to
1.5 × 104 average annual miles driven per
person.
We also find that there are
14.5 fatalities per billion miles, and
900 injuries per billion miles.
Expressed in another manner, on average this is
68.8 mean million miles between fatality, and
1.1 mean million miles between injury.
Using these NHSTA statistics and our derived
equation, we can estimate the lifetime odds of suf-
fering a vehicular injury or fatality. Given that life ex-
pectancy, at birth, for a middle-aged American was
roughly 68 years (it is longer for children born today),
let us for the sake of simplicity assume that the aver-
age person drives for 50 years of his lifetime. We now
find that
Pinjury ≈ 1 − e−(9.0×10−7i/mi)(1.5×104mi/yr)(50 yr) = 49.1%,
Pfatality ≈ 1 − e−(1.45×10−8f/mi)(1.5×104mi/yr)(50 yr) = 1.1%.
Whereas most government sources state that the
lifetime odds of being involved in a “serious” or
“major” vehicle accident are about 1 in 3, they do not
uniformly define what the metrics are for this cate-
gorization, nor do they comment on minor injuries.
Fatalities, on the other hand, are not ambiguous,
and numerous sources such as the National Safety
Council (2004) put the lifetime odds of death due to
injury in a vehicular accident at 1 in 84, or 1.2%. This
is in excellent agreement with our simple estimation.
We can also apply this line of reasoning to
the behavior of the robots in the DGCs. Although
we did not explicitly acquire statistics on the
mean time or distance between failures, particularly
because we frequently tested and worked out one
behavioral bug at a time, we did on occasion con-
duct some long, uninterrupted test runs, and during
these outings we generally felt that in the absence
of grossly anomalous road features, we could prob-
ably travel on the order of 100 miles between signif-
icant failures. Of course this value is highly variable,
being dependent on the type of road conditions be-
ing traversed. If one were lane tracking on a freeway,
the results would likely be an order of magnitude
better than those observed while negotiating dense
urban landscapes. Nonetheless, this average value of
α ∼ 0.01 mean failures per mile led one of our team
members to speculate that our chances of completing
the DGC2 course would be
Psuccess ≈ e−(0.01f/mi)(132 mi) = 26.7%.
Now what makes this interesting is that we can turn
this argument inside-out and consider the implica-
tions upon the other vehicles that participated in the
finals of the last two events. If we solve for the mean
failure rate α, we find
α = − ln (Ps)
x
.
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At the 2005 DGC2, 5 of the 23 finalists success-
fully finished the 132-mile course, whereas at the
2007 UCE, 6 of the 11 finalists finished (albeit with
a few instances of helpful human intervention) a
60-mile course (DARPA, 2008). Let us see what this
suggests:
αDGC2 = − ln ( 5/23)132 miles = 0.012 mean failures per mile,
αUCE = − ln ( 6/11)60 miles = 0.010 mean failures per mile.
Remarkably, the observational values between the
two DARPA final events not only agree with one an-
other but also agree with the crude estimate we had
formulated for our own vehicle. To be clear, we do
not in any manner wish to suggest that the quality of
any team’s accomplishments was simply a matter of
statistical fortune, nor do we want to make any sci-
entific claims with regard to the accuracy of these ob-
servations, given the very small statistics and large
assumptions made.
However, we do want to put the present-day ca-
pabilities of fully autonomous vehicles in perspec-
tive with regard to human abilities. In this context,
it would appear that humans are four orders of
magnitude better in preventing minor accidents and
perhaps six orders of magnitude better in avoiding
fatal (mission-ending) accidents. Therefore, the un-
deniable and key message is that the robotics com-
munity has abundant challenges yet to be solved
before we see the advent of an autonomobile in each
of our garages. To be fair, one can make a valid
case for very specific applications in which semi-
autonomous or autonomous vehicles would excel,
either presently or in the near future, but bear in mind
that these are far outside the scope of the general
automotive driving problem as framed above. Exam-
ples of near-term applications would likely include a
range of missions from robotic mining operations to
platooning of vehicles in highway “road trains.”
2.3. Observations Regarding Customer
Acceptance and Market Penetration
The availability of a technology or its proven effec-
tivenes is by no means a guarantee that the customer
will actually use it. Although present-day attitudes
in society have tipped in favor of not only accepting
but demanding more safety applications and regu-
lations, nonetheless a sizable portion of the popula-
tion views the driving experience as something that
should be unencumbered by assistance (or perceived
intrusions) from the vehicle itself. For some, it is sim-
ply a matter of enjoying the freedom and thrill of
driving, whereas for others, it can amount to a serious
mistrust of technology, especially that which is not
under their direct control. The reader will undoubt-
edly recall the public commotions made over the in-
troduction of ABS, airbags, and electronic stability
control. However, once drivers became sufficiently
familiar with these features, their concerns tended to
subside. On the other hand, it is yet to be seen how
the public will react to convenience and safety fea-
tures that employ semi- or fully autonomous tech-
nologies.
To illustrate this point, consider the case of seat
belts, arguably one of the simplest and most ef-
fective safety technologies invented. Although they
were patented at essentially the same time as the
automobile was invented (1885), 70 years passed
before they were offered as optional equipment on
production automobiles. Furthermore, it took a full
century, and legislative actions beginning in the mid-
1980s, before customers began to use them in any
significant numbers (refer to Figure 4). Even at the
present time, nearly 20% of Americans still refuse to
wear them (NHTSA, 2005).
Another issue confronting new technologies is
the speed at which we can expect penetration into
the marketplace. For some features, this is not a big
concern, whereas for others, the utility of the tech-
nology depends on universal acceptance. For exam-
ple, it does not matter very much if one customer
chooses not to purchase a premium sound system,
but on the other hand, the entire traffic system would
fail to work if headlamps were not a required feature.
Many factors enter into how fast a new technology is
implemented, including customer acceptance, avail-
ability, cost, and regulatory requirements.
For the case of semi- or fully autonomous driv-
ing, success will undoubtedly depend on having
as many vehicles as possible equipped with these
features. It has often been suggested that some
portion of roadways, the federal interstate system for
example, may in the future be regulated so as to ex-
clude vehicles that do not conform to a uniform set of
equipment requirements. Whereas having individual
autonomous vehicles on the roadway may improve
safety, having an entire fleet on the roadway could
also increase vehicular density, improve throughput,
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Figure 4. Seat belt usage in the United States as a function of time (left). Note the dramatic rise in acceptance following
legislation passed in 1984. Right: Actual and projected Japanese market penetration for ACC and LKA automotive driving
features.
and by platooning also reduce drag and improve fuel
economy.
Although statistics regarding the customer “take
rate” of optional features on a new car are often
closely guarded by individual OEMs, Figure 4 (Frost
& Sullivan, 2005) also presents a prediction of what
“fast adopters,” such as the Japanese market, are ex-
pected to do with regard to two of the basic robotic
building blocks leading toward autonomous opera-
tion: ACC and LKA. It should be noted that whereas
present-day acceptance for ACC in Japan and parts
of Europe is ∼15%, in the United States, it is a mere
4%. Perhaps more telling, the market penetration for
mature systems that merely provide informational
content (not vehicular control), such as GPS-based
navigation devices, is still limited to a small subset
of new vehicles.
2.4. Concluding Remarks Regarding
Implementation of Autonomy in Production
Vehicles
Whereas the accident statistics and relative reliabil-
ity of robots vs. human drivers clearly indicate am-
ple opportunities for future autonomous research so-
lutions, we have also illustrated that a number of
factors, including customer acceptance and deliv-
ery speed to the marketplace, will ultimately de-
termine when fully autonomous passenger vehicles
become a commonplace reality. In this regard, the
data refute optimistic projections of production-level
autonomobiles by model year (MY) 2015 as some
have claimed (military and industrial robotic appli-
cations obviously constitute a separate conversation)
but rather indicate a slower and continual progres-
sion of semi-autonomous driver support and safety
features. In this regard, we feel that the field of ac-
tive safety will ultimately lead the way, with robotics
and autonomous vehicle research becoming the key
enablers for these future systems.
3. VEHICLE ARCHITECTURE
One of the guiding principles in the design of our en-
try was to ensure that the hardware, sensors, and al-
gorithms developed not only addressed the mission
goals of the DUC but also offered a practical path to-
ward future production integration into other active
safety applications. In many phases of the project,
this philosophy implied that the wisest choice was to
employ production components, whereas there were
certain aspects of the DUC for which no technical
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
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solution presently exists, requiring that risks be taken
exploring novel sensing, hardware, and algorithms.
With limited time and resources, success depended
on choosing the right balance between status quo and
innovation. In the following, we provide an overview
of our vehicle hardware platform (Section 3.1), our
perceptual sensing suite (Section 3.2), and our soft-
ware architecture (Section 3.3) prior to our DARPA
site visit.
3.1. Platform
Based on the success of and lessons learned from the
Desert Tortoise used in the DGC2, the 2005 MY Ford
F250 again served as the platform for the IVS research
efforts. This truck series has been extensively used as
a rugged all-purpose workhorse, operating on roads
of all sizes and surface conditions around the world,
making it an ideal platform for a realistic autonomous
mission, commercial or military. We fabricated two
identical trucks for the DUC dubbed the “XAV-250”s,
models A and T.
Overarching the theme of simplicity stated ear-
lier, safety was always at the forefront of our efforts.
Each of the by-wire systems (throttle, brakes, steer-
ing, and transmission) operated with redundant me-
chanical interfaces, enabling the XAV-250 to easily
transition from human-controlled, street-legal to fully
autonomous operation by the flip of a switch. Occu-
pant and bystander safety was further enhanced by
the use of redundant, fully independent, remote wire-
less e-stop systems. When a pause or disable com-
mand was initiated, there were multiple means by
which it was obeyed.
3.1.1. Vehicle Control Unit
The vehicle control unit (VCU) was implemented
using a dSPACE AutoBox rapid control prototyp-
ing system and was primarily used to coordinate
the by-wire systems that control vehicle speed and
steering. Commonly used by automotive OEMs and
suppliers for algorithm development, it uses MAT-
LAB/Simulink/Stateflow and Real-Time Workshop
for automatic code generation. The VCU algorithms
ran a position control algorithm to control steering
wheel (hand wheel) position and a speed control al-
gorithm that coordinated the throttle and brake sys-
tems, and they also processed launch timing and
pause requests.
3.1.2. Throttle-by-Wire
The throttle on the production engine communicates
with the engine electronic control unit (ECU) via
three voltage signals. A mixing circuit inserted be-
tween the throttle pedal and ECU essentially added
the by-wire control commands to the outputs from
the throttle pedal itself. A dedicated microprocessor
with a watchdog timer was used for this interface;
nominally the throttle interface commands are issued
every 10 ms by the VCU, and if a valid command is
not received within 83 ms, the by-wire commands de-
fault to zero. This approach did not require modifica-
tions to the ECU or throttle pedal and has proven to
be simple, safe, and effective.
3.1.3. Brake-by-Wire
Modern active safety systems such as ABS, Advance-
Trac, ESC, and RSC control brake pressures to in-
crease vehicle stability. The XAV-250 has production-
representative ESC/RSC hydraulic brake hardware
and ECUs, with modified software and hardware
containing an additional CAN interface. These sys-
tems are regularly used by OEMs and suppliers to de-
velop and tune vehicle stability algorithms. Through
this interface, the VCU can command individual
brake pressures at each corner of the vehicle with the
full capability of the braking system. By using this
production-proven hardware, our vehicle robustness
and reliability has been very high.
The parking brake was automated to improve
safety and durability and to provide redundancy to
the main braking system. Keeping with the desire to
use production-proven parts, a MY 2000 Lincoln LS
electronic parking brake actuator was used to acti-
vate the parking brake. To prevent overheating of the
brake modulator, the vehicle was shifted into park
whenever the vehicle was at zero speed for an ex-
tended period of time, and the hydraulic pressure
was released on the main brakes. This allowed the
brake valves and disks to cool when they were not
needed. In the event of an unmanned e-stop disable,
the parking brake was actuated by a relay circuit in-
dependent of all computing platforms.
3.1.4. Steer-by-Wire
The steering system was actuated by a permanent-
magnet dc motor, chain-coupled to the upper steer-
ing column. The gear ratio (3.5:1) and inertia of the
motor are low enough that manual operation is not
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affected when power is removed. By coupling to the
upper steering column, the hydraulic power steer-
ing system aids the dc motor. For production vehi-
cles, the maximum driver torque needed to command
full power steering assist is ∼10 N-m. The motor can
deliver this torque at approximately 20% of its max-
imum capacity. To drive it, an off-the-shelf OSMC
H-bridge was used to create a high-current 12-V
PWM signal. Using a 12-V motor and drive electron-
ics simplified the energy management and switching
noise issues within the vehicle.
3.1.5. Shift-by-Wire
Transmission control was accomplished using a lin-
ear actuator to pull or push the transmission shift
cable. The position was determined using the pro-
duction sensor located inside the transmission hous-
ing. A microprocessor controls the linear actuator
and provides the interface to the manual shift selec-
tion buttons and VCU. It also senses vehicle speed
from the ECU and the vehicle state (run, disable,
pause) from the e-stop control panel and affords sim-
ple push-button manual operation with appropriate
safety interlocks. This approach did not require any
modification of the transmission or engine ECU and
resulted in a robust actuation that provided the same
retrotraverse capability that the Desert Tortoise had
in the DGC2.
3.1.6. E-Stop Interface System
The e-stop interface system connects the radio-
controlled e-stop system and the various by-wire
subsystems to control the operating modes of the
vehicle. This system was implemented using automo-
tive relays to increase reliability and reduce complex-
ity. The interface has two modes, development and
race, and two states, run and disable. In the devel-
opment mode, used when a safety driver is in the
vehicle, the disable state allows for full manual op-
eration of the vehicle and the run state provides full
autonomous operation. In the race mode, the vehi-
cle is unmanned and the by-wire systems conform to
DGC rules. Pause requests are handled by the VCU
to bring the vehicle to a gradual stop while still obey-
ing steering commands. Communication faults were
monitored within dSPACE, and a signal to actuate an
e-stop was issued when a fault was detected.
3.1.7. Navigation
Integration and support for the XAV-250 naviga-
tion system was provided by Honeywell, as de-
scribed in previously published reports (IVS, 2006,
2007a, 2007b). The system incorporated a com-
mercially available NovAtel GPS receiver using
OmniSTAR HP satellite corrections and was cou-
pled with Honeywell’s internally proprietary PING
(Prototype Inertial Navigation Gyro) package. The
PING has a high degree of flexibility, being capable of
using a variety of inertial measurement units (IMUs),
and can input various state observations besides GPS,
such as wheel speed odometry derived from the ve-
hicle. The navigation algorithms from the PING ex-
ported position, attitude, and acceleration and ro-
tation rates at 100 Hz, with the pose information
remaining stable and accurate even during GPS out-
ages of up to 20 or 30 min, owing to the high quality
of ring laser gyroscopes and accelerometers used in
their IMUs.
3.2. Sensors
Changes in the mission specifications, as well as the
transition from a desert environment to an urban en-
vironment, required that many alterations be made
to the sensing philosophy and implementation on the
XAV-250. In the earlier DGC2, obstacle detection and
path planning were essentially constrained to a nar-
row corridor closely aligned with a predefined dense
set of GPS waypoints. In the DUC, the game became
wide open, with sparse waypoints, large urban ex-
panses such as parking lots and intersections, and
more important, moving traffic surrounding the ve-
hicle. Clearly this dictated a new solution, capable of
sensing the dynamic world surrounding the vehicle
but also able to process the wealth of data in a real-
time manner.
The introduction of the revolutionary Velodyne
HDL-64E LIDAR seemed to be the answer to it all,
with 64 laser beams, a huge field of view (FOV),
360 deg in azimuth and 26.5 deg in elevation, 120-m
range, and ability to capture one million range points
per second at a refresh rate of up to 20 Hz. However,
this sensor had yet to be field tested, and with the
known limitations associated with previous LIDAR
systems, there was certainly some degree of hesitancy
to rely too heavily on this device. As such, it was ap-
parent that we would need to provide a redundant set
of coverage for the vehicle. This would not only offer
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Figure 5. Depiction of the long-range (left) and mid-range (right) sensing FOVs for typical roadways. The light blue trian-
gles depict ACC radars; the shaded pink circle the Velodyne LIDAR. Note that the various depictions are not necessarily
drawn to scale.
added confirmation of obstacle detections but would
also serve to enhance the robustness of the system to
the failure of a single sensor.
Whereas one could take the approach of adding
as many sensors as possible to the vehicle (and some
teams did in fact do so), this adds an unwieldy
burden to computational, electrical power, and ther-
mal management requirements. A better solution was
to determine where the XAV-250 most frequently
needed to “look” in order to satisfy the required DUC
mission maneuvers (Figure 5) and to place sensors of
the appropriate modality accordingly to fulfill these
needs. We conducted a detailed study to optimize this
problem, which included considerations such as the
following:
• mission requirements of the DUC (GPS way-
point density, road network geometry, route
replanning, merging, passing, stopping at in-
tersections, dealing with intermittent GPS re-
ception)
• infrastructure (intersections, traffic circles,
parking lots, dead-end roads)
• roadway design guidelines (line-of-sight re-
quirements, minimum and maximum road
grade and curvature, pavement vs. other
roadway surfaces)
• highway driving rules (observance of lane
markings, intersection precedence, spacing
between vehicles)
• closing velocity of traffic (following time and
look-ahead requirements)
• potential obstacles to be encountered (vehi-
cles, curbs, buildings, signs, power-line poles,
fences, concrete rails, construction obstacles,
foliage)
On the basis of our analysis, we initially settled
upon a sensing suite that included (in addition to
the Velodyne LIDAR) eight Delphi Forewarn ACC
radars, four Delphi dual-beam Back Up Aid (BUA)
radars, two Cybernet cameras, one Mobileye camera,
and two Riegl LIDARs. The overall sensor placement
is shown in the truck collage in Figure 6 and is also
described in more detail below.
Delphi’s 76-GHz ACC radars (Figure 7) are long-
range, mechanically scanning radars that have been
in production for years on Jaguars and Cadillacs. This
radar senses targets at 150 m with a 15-deg FOV and
updates its tracking list every 100 ms. A grouping of
three of these sensors were coupled together to form
a combined 45-deg forward FOV, enabling multilane,
curved road coverage. Three more ACC units were
strategically placed to also create a wide rearward
FOV, with one on the rear bumper and two placed
on the front outboard corners of the truck to provide
rear and adjacent lane obstacle tracking. Additionally,
two radars were mounted in a transverse direction on
the front corners to provide coverage of obstacles at
intersection zones.
In the forward center FOV, a Mobileye camera
was used, primarily to provide confirmation to the
ACC radars that targets were vehicles, but also to aid
with lane tracking. The other cameras were dedicated
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Figure 6. Collage of XAV-250 images revealing key elements of the external hardware. Truck overview (top left); protective
frontal exoskeleton with three embedded in-line ACC radars and single centered BUA radar underneath (top center); rear
view showing GPS mast on rooftop and protected pair of ACC and BUA radars (top right); side exoskeleton with ACC
and BUA radars (bottom left); climate-controlled and shock-isolated box containing computing cluster (bottom center); and
LIDAR and vision systems (bottom right), with Velodyne at apex, Riegls left and right, and cameras hidden within the
Velodyne tower and behind the windshield glass.
Figure 7. Delphi radars: 76-GHz ACC (left) and 24-GHz BUA (right).
to detect roadway lane markings and curbs and to log
visual data. The two Riegl LMS Q120 LIDARs each
had an 80-deg FOV with very fine (0.02 deg per step)
resolution. They were nominally set at distances of
12.5 and 25 m and used to detect curbs and aid the
Velodyne in placing static obstacles in the map. For
close-proximity sensing scenarios, e.g., U-turns, back-
ing up, maneuvering into a parking space, passing
a close-by vehicle, multiple Delphi BUA radars were
used (Figure 8). These sensors have an effective range
of ∼5 m; however, they do not return azimuth infor-
mation on the target.
3.3. Software
3.3.1. DGC2: An Arbiter-Based Design
In the prior DARPA Grand Challenge (DGC2),
the IVST team employed a situational dependent,
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Figure 8. Short-range sensor map illustrating the coverage of the Delphi BUAs.
arbitrating a behavior-based solution (Figure 9) as re-
ported in IVST (2005a, 2005b). The arbiter combined
the outputs from the current set of contextual behav-
iors to produce a resultant steering and speed re-
sponse. Each positive behavior would send its de-
sired steering response to the arbiter in the form of
a vector that represents the full range of steering,
with the value at each vector element being the de-
gree to which that specific behavior believes the vehi-
cle should steer. Negative behaviors sent a response
over the full steering range that represents steering
directions not to go. The arbiter produced a weighted
sum of all positive behaviors in which the weight
of a behavior is the product of an assigned relative
Figure 9. Schematic of the arbiter software architecture used by IVST during DGC2 (IVST, 2005a, 2005b).
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Figure 10. Location on the DGC2 course where the IVST Desert Tortoise departed corridor boundaries. Multiple competing
behaviors within the arbiter framework caused the vehicle to delay at a fork in the road. The correct route is the narrow
hidden pathway on the left, as indicated by our team member standing where a DARPA photographer had been filming.
weight of the behavior to other behaviors in a specific
environmental context and the confidence of the be-
havior. The superposition of the sum of negative be-
haviors was used to cancel out hazardous directions,
and then the peak of the final response was used as
the desired steering direction. Those behaviors that
control speed also provided a speed vector over the
full steering range, where the value of a vector ele-
ment represents the speed the behavior wants to go
for that steering direction. The arbiter took the mini-
mum speed over all behaviors for the chosen steering
direction.
Although this framework proved effective at the
NQE, during the final event a situation occurred in
which multiple competing behaviors with high con-
fidence came into play at one time. These included,
but were not necessarily limited to, vision-based road
following (a very successful feature) locked onto the
wide forward path while having an obstructed view
toward the turn, a navigation request to turn sharply
left onto a very narrow road, and apparent in-path
obstacle detections of a pedestrian as well as from a
cloud of dust created by the rapid deceleration to the
intersection speed limit. Though the correct behavior
did eventually prevail, the arbitration delay initiated
a chain of events (Figure 10) that led to a minor de-
parture from the course and ultimately the team’s dis-
qualification. Learning from this lesson, the IVS team
decided to pursue a map-based sensor fusion strat-
egy for the DUC that was neither situational depen-
dent nor arbitrated.
3.3.2. Site-Visit Software Architecture
At the time of the DUC DARPA site visit, the bulk
of the XAV-250 software was provided by Honeywell
and is described in detail in previously published
reports (IVS, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). We briefly review
some key elements of the architecture, as depicted in
Figure 11.
Mission controller: The function of the mission
controller is to encapsulate the high-level logic
needed to accomplish a mission and to distribute that
information to the other components in the system.
Each software element is responsible for producing
certain events, which can trigger state changes and
react to changes in state.
Mapper: The one map (TOM) accepts classifica-
tion data (unseen, empty, road, line, curb, obstacle)
from each sensor, fuses them spatially and tempo-
rally, and provides a single map that contains the
probabilities of each classification per sensor per cell.
Updates to the map are asynchronous per sensor.
The map is composed of 1024 × 1024, 0.25 × 0.25 m
grid cells, centered on the vehicle. The map is im-
plemented as a doubly circular buffer (or torus), and
TOM scrolls this map with the movement of the
truck (determined from the PING). Each cell contains
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Figure 11. Schematic drawing of the software architecture employed on the IVS vehicle at the 2007 DARPA site visit. White
boxes indicate major software components and gray boxes embedded hardware.
every sensor’s estimated probability of the classifica-
tion as being unseen, empty, road, line, curb, or ob-
stacle. A fusion algorithm is run at 10 Hz across the
center 512 × 512 cells (128 × 128 m) to derive a single
probability of classification for each cell. TOM feeds
these data to both the short term planner and the
graphical user interface (GUI).
Long-term planner: The long-term planner is re-
sponsible for determining the route the truck will
take through its mission. It reads the route network
definition file (RNDF) and mission definition file
(MDF) and then based on the GPS position of the
truck, determines where it is on the route network
and creates a high-level plan consisting of a sequence
of RNDF waypoints to reach the checkpoints speci-
fied by the MDF. This plan is devised using Dijkstra’s
shortest-path algorithm, with edge weights in the
constructed graph determined based on a variety
of factors, including estimated distance, speed limit
specified in the MDF, and whether the system has
recently experienced that road to be blocked. The
long-term planner provides the planned route to the
short-term planner.
Short-term planner: The short-term planner takes
as input the position of the truck, the next goal from
the long-term planner, and the fused map from TOM
and produces a path to that next goal. The plan-
ning problem is formulated as a gradient descent in a
Laplacian potential field.
Speed planner: The speed planner takes as input
the obstacle map and the path computed by the short-
term planner and calculates a safe speed along that
path by considering a number of issues, including
intersecting tracks, proximity to obstacles, curvature,
speed limits, and zones.
Path follower: The path follower takes as input the
position, heading and speed of the truck, and a list of
path points from the speed planner and calculates a
goal point on the desired path just ahead of the front
axle using a vehicle model. The position and curva-
ture of the path at the goal point is used to calculate
a steering wheel position command, which is passed
to the VCU, implemented in a dSPACE AutoBox.
4. TRANSITION TO THE IVS/MIT VEHICLE
ARCHITECTURE
An internal assessment of the state of the project was
conducted after the IVS team took a few weeks to di-
gest the results of the DARPA site visit. Although the
demonstrated functionality was sufficient to satisfac-
torily complete all the required site-visit milestones,
it had become obvious that there were a number of
problems with our approach that would preclude
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completing the final system development on sched-
ule. These issues included unexpected delays intro-
duced by both hardware and software development
and were compounded by team staffing limitations.
Although we will not elaborate on the details, we will
point out a couple of examples to help the reader un-
derstand our subsequent and seemingly radical shift
in plans. At the time of the site visit, our middle
ware employed a field-based, Laplacian path planner,
which had been demonstrated in other robotic appli-
cations (IVS, 2007a, and references therein), notably
with unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). In the context of
the DUC, successful implementation of the Laplacian
planner required the inclusion of pseudo obstacles to
prevent “undesired optimal” paths, a simple exam-
ple being a four-way intersection. Without painted
lane markings existing within the intersection itself,
the “un-aided” Laplacian planner would calculate
the best path as one passing directly through the cen-
ter of the intersection, obviously causing the vehicle
to depart its lane. Whereas these limitations could be
overcome in principle, in practice the myriad of topo-
logical possibilities made this algorithmic approach
time consuming and cumbersome.
Also of major concern at the time of site visit were
infrequent but significant positional errors exported
by the inertial navigation system (INS). Although
the PING IMU was undeniably orders of magni-
tude more sensitive than the commercial units em-
ployed by most of the other teams, this also resulted
in complications with tuning its prototype software
(Kalman filter parameters) to accommodate a com-
mercial GPS input as one of the state estimators.
Given that the functionality of virtually everything
on the vehicle relied on having accurate pose infor-
mation, Honeywell focused its efforts on this system,
and it was decided that additional external collabo-
rative resources would be solicited to complete final
system development on schedule.
MIT was a logical candidate in this regard, ow-
ing largely to the preexisting, well-established Ford–
MIT Research Alliance. A fair number of projects
falling under this umbrella included students and
professors who were also part of MIT’s DUC team.
Furthermore, the teams had been in contact before-
hand, as Ford had provided them prior support,
including help with the acquisition of their Land
Rover LR3 platform. As a side benefit, expanded con-
tact between the teams would allow both sides to
assess options for future joint autonomous vehicle
research.
By mid-August, an agreement in principle had
been made to work together. After clearing this pro-
posal with DARPA, an implementation plan was de-
vised. Although IVS had an existing set of code, al-
beit with gaps, it was instantly apparent that it would
be far quicker to simply migrate to the MIT middle-
ware code (Leonard et al., 2008) than it would be to
try to merge disparate pieces of software. On the pos-
itive side, the MIT software was already successfully
running on their platform, and the code structure
was generic enough to incorporate most sensor types
into their mapper. On the negative side, we would be
dealing with a vast amount of code for which we had
no inner knowledge, the transition would require a
large rip up of hardware and software architecture,
and we would no longer have a second identical
truck for development.
4.1. Undeployed IVS Sensor Technology
Another one of the negatives of transitioning to the
MIT architecture was that several novel sensing sys-
tems that were being developed by IVS (and part-
ners) had to be put on hold so that all personnel
resources could be reallocated to ensure successful
completion of the ambitious software transition. The
remainder of this section illustrates a few examples,
not only to point out that they could have been
migrated to the MIT platform given enough time,
but also because they are still under consideration
and/or development, and moreover there may be
useful new information for the reader (particularly
concerning results from the Velodyne LIDAR effort).
4.1.1. Lane detection
Redundant vision systems were under development
to aid in the fault tolerance of lane detection. A cus-
tomized Mobileye vision system with a primary fo-
cal point of 40 m and a Cybernet vision system with
a primary focal point of 25 m were in development
prior to the site visit. Each system was capable of de-
tecting lane markings and vision gradient differences
between the roadway and side of the road. Figure 12
is an example of urban driving data acquired from
the Delphi/Mobileye fused radar and vision appli-
cation taken on a surrogate vehicle using a produc-
tion intent system composed of a single radar and
camera. The XAV-250 implementation was being de-
veloped to use three radars, effectively increasing the
radar FOV for forward object detection by a factor of
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Figure 12. Delphi/Mobileye radar/vision fusion with lane detection and in-path targets.
Figure 13. Cybernet vision system roadway and traversability detection example.
three. Although the vision system has a fairly wide
FOV, it was initially intended to confirm radar targets
only from the center channel. Figure 13 illustrates two
alpha-version feature-extraction applications derived
from the Cybernet vision system as actually installed
on the XAV-250. The algorithm running on the left
identifies lane markings and other sharp-edged fea-
tures, such as curbs and sidewalks. The algorithm on
the right searches for traversable surfaces, based on
contrasts in color and texture, and is heavily influ-
enced by the sample roadway immediately in front
of the vehicle (yellow box).
4.1.2. Velodyne Processing
The Velodyne HDL-64E was the primary perceptual
sensor used by team IVS, both before and after the
transition to the MIT code base. It provided 360-deg
FOV situational awareness and was used for both
static and dynamic obstacle detection and tracking
and curb and berm detection, and preliminary re-
sults also suggested that painted-line lane detection
on asphalt was possible via the intensity channel. The
HDL-64E operates on the premise that instead of a
single laser firing through a rotating mirror, 64 lasers
are mounted on upper and lower blocks of 32 lasers
each, and the entire unit spins. This design allows
for 64 separate lasers to each fire thousands of times
per second, providing far more data points per sec-
ond and a much richer point cloud than conventional
“push-broom” LIDAR designs. Each laser/detector
pair is precisely aligned at predetermined vertical an-
gles, resulting in an effective 26.8-deg vertical FOV.
By spinning the entire unit at speeds up to 900 rpm
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(15 Hz), a 360-deg FOV is achieved (resulting in 1 mil-
lion 3D points per second).
Sampling characteristics: Each Velodyne data
frame consists of 12 “shots” and is acquired over
a period of 384 μs. This data frame is packetized
and transmitted over the network via UDP at a fixed
rate. To properly decode and transform points into
the world frame requires compensating for the ro-
tational effect of the unit, as all of the lasers within
a block are not fired coincidentally. Each shot con-
sists of data from one block of 32 lasers; however,
the Velodyne fires only four lasers at a time with
a 4-μs lapse between firings during collection of a
full shot. Therefore, 32 lasers per block divided by 4
lasers per firing yields 8 firings per shot, with a to-
tal elapsed time of 8 × 4 μs = 32 μs (thus 32 μs × 12
shots = 384 μs to acquire 1 data frame). This means
that per shot, the head actually spins a finite amount
in yaw while acquiring one shot’s worth of data. The
reported yaw angle for each shot is the sampled en-
coder yaw at the time the first group of four lasers are
fired, so that in actuality, the yaw changes by δ yaw =
spin rate × 4 μs between the groups of four firings,
such that on the eighth firing the unit has spun by
spin rate × 28 μs. For example, on a unit rotating at
10 Hz (i.e., 600 rpm), this would amount to 0.1 deg
of motion intrashot, which at a range of 100 m would
result in 17.6 cm of lateral displacement.
Coordinate transformation: Figure 14 illustrates the
HDL-64E sensor geometry used for coordinate frame
decomposition. The unit is mechanically actuated to
spin in a clockwise direction about the sensor’s ver-
tical z axis, zs . Encoder yaw  is measured with
0.01-deg resolution with respect to the base and is
positive in the direction shown. Each laser is individ-
ually calibrated and parameterized by its azimuth φ
and elevation θ angle (measured with respect to the
rotating xs–ys sensor head coordinate frame) and by
two parallax offsets, pv and ph (measured orthogonal
to the laser axis), which account for the noncoaxial
laser/detector optics. Thus, a time-of-flight range re-




























where d is the measured range and α =  − φ. For
real-time computation, this mapping can be pre-
cached into a look-up table indexed by laser ID, i, and
encoder yaw (i.e., a 64 × 3,600 LUT) so that only three
multiplies and three additions are needed per laser
for decoding to the sensor frame:
xs = d ê(i, ψ) + p(i, ψ). (2)
Points can then subsequently be mapped to the world
frame based on vehicle pose. In our system, navi-
gation updates were provided at a rate of 100 Hz;
Figure 14. Velodyne HDL-64E sensor coordinate frame used for decomposition (laser beam depicted in red).
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Figure 15. UMichMap Velodyne LIDAR interface.
therefore, we causally interpolated vehicle pose to the
time stamp of each shot using forward Euler integra-
tion with a constant-velocity kinematic model.
Site-Visit Technology—UMichMap: An indepen-
dent alliance between Ford and the University
of Michigan was responsible for developing
UMichMap, the software package that interfaced
and processed the raw data from the HDL-64E. At
the time of the site visit this software comprised two
well-tested algorithms: obstacle/traversable area
detection and lane marking detection. A third algo-
rithm, dynamic obstacle tracking, was undergoing
alpha testing. All algorithms classified 0.25-m grid
cells within a sliding tessellated map that was output
to a global map for fusion with other sensor maps.
Obstacle detection involved first eliminating
overhead features (bridges, trees, etc.) that did not ob-
struct the safe passage of the vehicle. An object within
a cell was then classified as an obstacle if it verti-
cally exceeded an above-ground-plane threshold of
0.25 m and there was confirmational evidence from
neighboring cells. During the demonstration runs at
the actual site visit, this threshold was temporar-
ily increased to 1 m due to a ranging problem in
the presence of retroreflective tape (discussed below).
Preliminary results of lane detection were positive.
The algorithm was based on thresholding the Velo-
dyne intensity channel returns and then fitting a con-
tour to the remaining data points using a RANSAC
(Fischler & Bolles, 1981) framework. Simply speak-
ing, if the return amplitude ranged from a value of
200 up to the maximum of 255, it was considered to
be a candidate lane marking (for comparison, typi-
cal range intensities for asphalt were well below a
value of 100). Of those remaining thresholded points,
those with a sufficient RANSAC model consensus
were deemed actual lanes. Finally, a GUI using GLUT
(OpenGL Utility Toolkit) was developed for real-time
display, data log playback, analysis, and calibration.
Figure 15 is a composite image illustrating how
data captured from the Velodyne are processed in the
UMichMap system architecture. The photo on the left
is a typical road segment at Ford’s Dearborn campus.
The center image depicts a single data frame captured
from the Velodyne HDL-64E, with each LIDAR beam
color coded by the intensity of the return. One mil-
lion range measurements per second are transformed
into Earth frame coordinates, used to map the ground
plane, and determine where the XAV-250 can physi-
cally drive. This “driveability” index (one of several
exported attribute features) is shown on the right for
each 0.25 × 0.25 m cell surrounding the vehicle. It
should be noted that as the vehicle moved, the drive-
ability map would rapidly fill in as the laser beams
swept the entire region in front of the truck.
Site-Visit Lesson—LIDAR Issues Associated with
Highly Reflective Materials: The software developed
for the Velodyne LIDAR proved to be a huge success,
especially after incorporating the latest firmware up-
grades that were designed to correct some vexing
hardware issues. However, one item that had yet to
be perfected, and for that matter is still unresolved,
involves the intensity channel information from each
of the 64 beams in the HDL-64E model. The last
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Figure 16. Michigan Proving Grounds vehicle dynamics test area, precision steering course, and site-visit course. Lane
markings for the site-visit course were laid out using reflective highway construction tape. The intersection area contained
in the red rectangle is discussed in the next figure.
firmware upgrade enabled our unit to detect obsta-
cles to beyond 100 m, and when our vehicle was
parked anywhere within the site visit course, we were
easily able to detect all of the painted lines.
Furthermore, the center of the lines registered in
our map to within one pixel or less of where they
were calculated to be from the geometry of the site-
visit course (Figure 16) as determined by the GPS sur-
vey markers. (For the record, it is not known how ac-
curately the lane marking tape was actually laid with
respect to these points.)
Surprisingly, when we processed these data
through the obstacle detection algorithm, we saw
phantom obstacles appearing on the lines, growing in
size with distance from the Velodyne (see Figures 17
and 18). A brief discussion of LIDAR is needed in or-
der to explain this effect. Most LIDAR manufactur-
ers calculate the range based on the time at which the
back-scattered (returned) beam intensity reaches its
maximum. Under normal circumstances, this would
physically correspond to the brightest spot of the
projected beam, typically the center of the dispersed
spot. The problem is that laser returns from highly re-
flective materials, such as retroreflecting paint found
on traffic signs (in our case, road construction tape),
are orders of magnitude brighter than those from
Figure 17. We observed large range variations as the
beams swept over road lane marking tape at our site-visit
course. These delta ranges ended up causing our obsta-
cle detection algorithm to put spurious pixels on the map
in these locations. Note the fourfold symmetry in the lane
“zigzag” about the lateral and longitudinal axes. The red
arrows highlight that this effect is more pronounced as the
laser incidence angle to the line increases; the yellow ar-
rows show that this effect is less so when the sweeping an-
gle of incidence is small.
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Figure 18. Screen capture (top) of some of the beams cross-
ing a single piece of lane marking tape, ∼10 cm wide. The
lilac colored one is laser 0 and in our configuration falls
on the ground at the 20 m horizontal range. The concen-
tric circles are ±0.25 m from the nominal arc everywhere
else. Conceptually, a simple-minded explanation (bottom)
would be provided by the following observation: if the
maximum intensity in a range sample return defines the
range, then we could see something like that which occurs
in the real data.
normal materials. As such, the return will imme-
diately saturate the detector, and the peak signal
will occur at the time when the beam first strikes
the reflector and not necessarily at the center of the
beam spot. As such, the circular sweeping beam from
the Velodyne produces a zigzag discontinuity in the
range measurements upon crossing a retroreflecting
line. Just prior to and after striking the line, the range
is correct. However, when the beam first strikes the
line, the perceived range is too short, and at the point
where the beam exits the line, the range is perceived
as too long. The magnitude of the discontinuity in-
creases with distance owing to the divergence of the
projected beam and over the span of the site-visit
course could exceed 0.5 m. The implications for ob-
stacle detection algorithms are obvious.
We considered at least three methods to deal with
this. One was to simply leave the lines as real obsta-
cles in the map. The problem with this approach is
that the planner needed to ignore lines when pass-
ing stalled vehicles, and additional logic would have
been required to establish that these were in fact
lines. Additionally, declaring them as physical ob-
jects would slightly narrow the lane widths (by at
Figure 19. Interlaser intensity variation within a single
scan across a uniform asphalt surface.
least two pixels, each 0.25 m wide), something we
could ill afford with a vehicle the size of an F250.
Second, we had characterized the intensity of laser
returns for each of the 64 beams when scattering off
asphalt (Figure 19); hence we could easily identify the
lines from the pavement. Although we did in fact
demonstrate this method as a means to easily dis-
criminate lane markings, it required more logic to
implement than the temporary solution we settled
upon—simply raising the threshold for what was de-
clared an obstacle.
Interestingly, a somewhat similar phenomenon
was observed while the vehicle was parked in the
garage at our site-visit location, which had a smooth
cement floor. A gaping hole appeared in the range
map in front of the vehicle. Upon further investi-
gation, we noted a large retroreflecting sign on the
wall several meters in front of the vehicle. The back-
scattered laser return from the floor was obviously
far weaker than the forward-scattered signal off the
floor and back again from the bright sign. The sign
was thus observed twice, once in the correct loca-
tion by the higher elevation beams that hit it directly
and second “beneath the floor” by the beams that
reflected off the cement and then struck the sign.
Unexpected artifacts of this nature plague nearly all
sensors and as such explain the need for redundant
sensing systems and conformational data in produc-
tion products such as automobiles. Whereas we were
concerned that this might be an issue in the race, as
far as we could ascertain, traffic signs and license
plates were never aligned so as to produce these
ghost obstacles.
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Figure 20. Schematic drawing of the MIT base code soft-
ware architecture (Leonard et al., 2008).
4.2. Making the XAV-250 “Look” Like MIT’s LR3
At the start of the transition to the MIT architecture
(Figure 20), the MIT team members were actively en-
gaged with tasks to add advanced navigation traf-
fic capabilities to their platform. To minimize distrac-
tions to their efforts, it was decided to change the
XAV-250 actuation, infrastructure, and sensing suite
to match MIT’s LR3 as closely as possible. With these
alterations, it was also necessary for Ford to write
several software and interface modules, as illustrated
by the schematic in Figure 21. Some of the notable
major changes are as follows:
• In the site-visit configuration of the IVS ve-
hicles, the compute cluster used a mixture
of Advantech and Dell servers. The Dell
servers were smaller and had higher speed
CPUs, whereas the physically larger Advan-
tech servers had increased external I/O card
capacity and were compatible with the Math-
Works xPC rapid prototyping software. To
increase computational power, the Advan-
tech computers were removed and the Dell
computers from both IVS vehicles were com-
bined into the race vehicle, resulting in a com-
pute cluster with 24 compute cores. Although
fewer than the 40 cores used by MIT, they
were sufficient to run their core software with
our reduced sensor set.
• With the removal of the Advantech comput-
ers, the CAN concentrator was replaced with
an array of EthCAN modules. These mod-
ules were based on a Keil software evaluation
board (model MCB2370) using an ARM9 pro-
cessor and were programmed to pass CAN
messages to the compute cluster via Ethernet.
Each module supported two CAN networks.
For each CAN message received, the EthCAN
module would transmit the CAN header in-
formation and data bits using one Ethernet
packet. Similarly, an Ethernet message could
be sent to the EthCAN module, and it would
repackage the information to produce one
CAN message. The EthCAN array was used
Figure 21. Schematic drawing of the software architecture employed on the IVS vehicle after the transition to the MIT
code.
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to interface the radars and VCU (dSPACE
AutoBox) to the main compute cluster. It
should be noted that the MIT software archi-
tecture does not take advantage of the pre-
processing that resides within the ACC radar
units (e.g., closest in path target identifica-
tion). Relying solely on raw radar data, the
MIT development team created their own
radar processing software. The reader is di-
rected to the MIT documentation (Leonard
et al., 2008) for details related to this data pro-
cessing.
• The EthCAN modules and the PING had dif-
ficulties supporting high-speed Ethernet traf-
fic. In the final configuration, two Ethernet
switches were added to form low- (10 Mb/s),
medium- (100 Mb/s), and high- (1 Gb/s)
speed networks.
• In the ADU command interface, control mes-
sages sent from the MIT core software were
repackaged and sent via CAN messaging to a
dSPACE AutoBox for by-wire execution. An
EthCAN module performed the conversion
between Ethernet and the AutoBox CAN net-
work. The AutoBox contained the VCU soft-
ware that controlled the low-level functions
of the by-wire systems and monitored signals
for fault detection. Hardware-based monitor-
ing was also implemented if the CAN con-
nections were broken or the network failed.
If a hardware, software, or out-of-range sig-
nal was detected, an emergency stop was
requested. In a similar fashion, the vehicle
by-wire states were sent back to the main con-
troller module running in the MIT core soft-
ware for state information and for fault mon-
itoring.
• To avoid camera interface issues, the team
decided that the quickest way to implement
the MIT lane detection algorithms on the IVS
vehicle would be to add three roof-mounted
Point Grey Firefly MV cameras. The num-
ber of cameras was limited by computational
capability. Unfortunately, the Mobileye sys-
tem was abandoned due to its incompatibil-
ity with the MIT software architecture. On a
similar note, the Cybernet algorithms, which
had been operational well in advance of the
site visit, were also never integrated.
• In contrast to the LR3, the XAV-250 was
equipped with Delphi BUA radars that gave
nearby obstacle information out to a range
of 5 m. This improved reliability in detecting
low-lying, close-by obstacles that fell within
the Velodyne vehicle shadow. To take advan-
tage of the BUA units, Ford developed a sen-
sor interface function that allowed BUA data
to be processed by the MIT software. This
software function first read the BUA mes-
sages from the CAN bus in real time and then
transformed the range returns into map coor-
dinates based on the BUA calibration and ve-
hicle pose within the map. If sufficient returns
had accumulated in a particular location, that
position, with the inclusion of a dilatational
radius, was classified as a high-weighted ob-
stacle in the map.
• The LR3 incorporated a large number of SICK
line-scanning LIDARs, which have a nomi-
nal resolution of 1 deg per step. The XAV-
250 used two high-resolution Riegl LIDARs
for the same “push-broom” functionality, ac-
quiring range returns at 0.02 deg per step. The
Riegl interface function generically repack-
aged the data into laser scan packets that the
MIT software could use.
• The MIT software expected input from an
Applanix POS LV 220 INS; thus an emulator
was written by Ford to pass the Honeywell
PING data in the same format.
Much of the effort to adapt the MIT software
to the IVS platform was spent changing calibrations
concerning vehicle parameters and sensor reference
locations. In most cases, the changes could be made
rather easily via calibration files; however, in some in-
stances, these values were hard-coded constants that
needed to be identified and changed within the code
itself. Within 3 weeks after deciding to reconfigure
the XAV-250, testing began using the MIT software
and toolset.
Once testing was underway, it was determined
that some additional physical, electrical, and software
changes were needed to accommodate the “denser”
computing cluster, including the installation of larger
battery capacity, redistribution of electrical loads be-
tween the front and rear electrical systems, and redi-
rection of the cooling air flow in the rear environmen-
tal computer enclosure.
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5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
5.1. Testing at El Toro with MIT
MIT team members visited Dearborn in early
October, with the primary objective to help fine-tune
the parameters that are used by the vehicle predic-
tion model portion of the planner code. Prior to this
time, we were having limited success in operating
their code on our vehicle. However, once this exercise
was complete, we quickly were able to demonstrate
a variety of autonomous behaviors on the XAV-250,
many of which exhibited peculiarities such as MIT
was reporting from their LR3. It was at this point
that the potential utility of collaborative testing was
fully realized, and MIT suggested that we join them
at a test facility on the El Toro Marine Corps Base.
With some last-minute alterations to our schedule, we
were able to divert the truck to southern California
and achieved approximately 1 week of joint testing
prior to the NQE.
Testing with two different robotic vehicles on the
course at the same time proved to be very productive,
with each team learning from the other. MIT had been
at El Toro for a couple of weeks prior to our arrival
and had constructed a RNDF of the road network,
as well as a variety of MDFs. On our first attempt at
their course, we had serious difficulties staying in our
lane due to a constant bias in position. We had wit-
nessed this before, watching a number of elite teams
exhibit this behavior at the first two Grand Chal-
lenges. The problem was obvious to us: MIT used an
Applanix INS, which by default exports coordinates
in the NAD83 datum, whereas our system used the
WGS84 datum, the same as DARPA uses. In southern
California, these happen to differ by approximately
1.5 m, or roughly half a lane width. After a code fix by
MIT and a translation of coordinates in the RNDF, we
were soon driving robotically past one another with-
out issues.
With some cooperative help from MIT, we were
able to successfully demonstrate the operational ca-
pability of each of the sensors and processes (specific
task algorithms, such as curb detection) that the MIT
code would support on our platform. A highlight of
the testing was the ability to validate all of the in-
tersection precedence scenarios with both robots and
traffic vehicles involved. Numerous consecutive runs
were made to ensure consistent behavior, and the suc-
cess of this effort was later apparent at the NQE and
UCE, where (to our knowledge) neither MIT nor IVS
ever made a traffic-related driving error. The only real
downside of traveling to El Toro was the interruption
caused by the Los Angeles wildfires, which shortened
our available test time and introduced some hard-
ware problems associated with the fallout of very fine
ash.
As a final note, we would like to clarify that when
IVS and MIT finished testing at El Toro, there was
a code split and no further technical interaction oc-
curred between the teams until after the race. We felt
strongly that there should be no advantage afforded
to either team, relative to the field of contenders,
based on any prior knowledge gained while under-
going testing at the NQE.
5.2. NQE and UCE
At various points during the NQE and/or UCE, we
successfully demonstrated each of the sensor modal-
ities and software algorithms that were capable of
being supported by the MIT code. As it turned out,
it was not always possible to operate the full sens-
ing and software suite simultaneously, and as such,
in the end we converged upon the simplest stable
configuration possible. This consisted of GPS way-
point following, the Velodyne LIDAR, and a small
set of Delphi ACC radars, notably including the front
forward unit. Throughout our vehicle evaluation on
the NQE sites, and during additional testing, we en-
countered and solved numerous problems, with both
the hardware and the software. There were, however,
some bugs for which no near-term solution existed,
and this impacted what we could reliably run. Even
though some of the observed anomalies occurred on
a rare basis and we could likely have operated more
of our system, we chose not to, as we did not un-
derstand the root causes, and moreover because the
same functionality could be obtained with a simpler
solution. To reiterate, although some sensors were
not used for autonomous decision making, the sensor
hardware itself was operational, and in many cases
data from these systems were recorded for later res-
imulation studies.
5.2.1. NQE: Area C, the “Belt Buckle”
Our first test session occurred in Area C (see
Figure 22), referred to by many as the “belt buckle.”
This test was presumably designed to evaluate navi-
gation, intersection logic and traffic precedence, and
route replanning when presented with a blocked
path.
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
McBride et al.: Safety Lessons Learned from the DARPA Grand Challenges • 831
Figure 22. Area C: intersection logic and dynamic replanning. Aerial photo of Area C course (top); red arrow indicates
the intersection depicted in the figures below. XAV-250 successfully exhibits advanced traffic behavior (bottom left). MIT
viewer rendering of the RNDF and tracked cars at the intersection (bottom right).
For both of our runs in Area C, we demonstrated
flawless execution of intersection logic and traffic
precedence, with the truck stopping precisely at the
painted stop lines and no errors occurring in any of
the intersection scenarios. In each run, we accurately
navigated the course via GPS waypoint tracking and
by utilizing the curb detection process fed from both
types of LIDAR—the two push-broom Riegls and the
Velodyne. Although video was recorded for data log-
ging purposes, the lane detection process was not em-
ployed for navigational guidance. This decision was
made primarily in light of the abundance of curbs
and the faintness of painted lines in this neighbor-
hood but to some extent by issues we were experi-
encing with our vision hardware and software. At the
time of the first run, we had not had an opportunity
to validate the camera calibration (following trans-
port from El Toro), and on the second run, we did
not want to introduce changes to what had worked
successfully the first time.
For us, the route replanning proved to be among
the most problematic of any of the NQE tasks, and we
would spend the majority of our remaining free time
at the event in an effort to solve this issue. On our first
run in Area C, the truck was issued a DARPA pause
command after it attempted to circumnavigate the
road blockage by cutting between the construction
barrels and a large tree in the adjacent yard. We were
allowed to reposition the vehicle on the road, and on
the second attempt it executed a U-turn; however,
it did so by departing the street again and complet-
ing the maneuver on a lawn. When the truck reached
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
832 • Journal of Field Robotics—2008
the second blockage constructed from stop signs on
gated arms, it immediately recognized them as obsta-
cles, stopped for several seconds, and again appeared
as if it was going to seek a route around them. Coinci-
dentally, our test time ran out at this moment, so the
final outcome in this scenario remains uncertain.
The behavior exhibited here was initially unex-
pected, and explaining it requires a discussion of the
MIT planner code. The blockage occurred immedi-
ately in front of a checkpoint on what was essentially
a circular loop. In this case, it is topologically impos-
sible, following highway rules of the road, for the ve-
hicle to replan a route reaching the checkpoint. The
only way this point could be achieved would be to a
priori assume that the same blockage would exist af-
ter the vehicle had circled the course in the opposite
direction and furthermore that the vehicle could and
would execute another U-turn so as to be in the cor-
rect lane in the correct orientation. Unfortunately, this
scenario was overlooked in the planning logic and
had not been discovered in our limited prior testing,
as there had always been an intersecting roadway,
providing a valid alternative route, between block-
ages and the next checkpoint.
5.2.2. NQE: Area A, the “Circles of Death”
The second test site we visited was Area A, a
place we personally called the “circles of death” (see
Figure 23). By our account, there were about a dozen
traffic cars traveling bidirectionally around an outer
oval of roughly 300 m in circumference. Our task was
to make left-hand loops on a subsection of the course,
yielding through gaps in the oncoming traffic, and
pulling out from a stop sign onto a very narrow sec-
tion of road abutted on one side by a solid concrete
barrier.
We felt that our performance here was very good,
despite receiving a fair number of honks from the
traffic vehicles. In each of our two attempts, we com-
pleted more than a dozen laps, many of them perfect.
Our robot always recognized traffic and precedence
and never came close to hitting a moving object. The
difficulty in this task stemmed not only from the den-
sity of traffic, but also from our interpretation of the
rules, in which we assumed a requirement of allot-
ting several vehicle lengths of spacing between our
truck and the traffic vehicles. Given that our vehicle
is roughly 7 m in length and we had to allow spac-
ing in both directions when exiting the stop sign, very
little room or time was left for traffic gaps along the
60-m stretch we were merging onto. Adding to the
challenge was the 9 s it took for the XAV-250 to accel-
erate from a stop to 10 mph through the tight 90-deg
turn. There were quite a few cases in which our vehi-
cle would determine it was clear to go and then balk
as a traffic vehicle would make the far turn from the
transverse segment of the course onto the segment
we were merging onto. Although the Velodyne was
identifying the traffic vehicles across the entire span
of the test site, our intersection algorithm did not clas-
sify these vehicles as obstacles of concern and assign
them a track file until they entered a predefined zone
surrounding the intersection itself.
On our first attempt at the course, we used GPS
waypoint tracking and vision-based detection of lane
markings for navigation, and left the curb detection
algorithm off. There were few curbs on the loop, and
we had also recently discovered the potential for a
software bug to appear when the vision lane tracker
Figure 23. Area A “circles of death.” XAV-250 waits to merge into traffic (left). MIT viewer showing the RNDF course with
obstacles derived from the radars and Velodyne point cloud (right).
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and curb detection algorithm reported conflicting es-
timates of the lane width or position. This approach
worked on all but one lap. In that instance, a group
of traffic vehicles passed very close to the F250 on
the corner farthest from the stop sign; the truck took
the corner perhaps 1 m wide and struck or drove
atop the curb. We were generally very pleased, how-
ever, with the registration of our sensors (LIDAR and
radar) with respect to ground truth, as the vehicle
maintained the center of its lane while tracking very
close to the concrete barriers.
We did make a change to our sensing strategy
on the second run, however. In this case, we chose to
run the curb detection algorithm and turn the vision-
based lane tracking off. This decision was prompted
in part by some bugs that had cropped up in the vi-
sion software, as well as by performing a resimula-
tion of our previous run. This simulation showed that
the curb function provided excellent guidance along
the concrete barriers and on the curbs on the back side
of the loop, with the GPS waypoints on the other two
segments being sufficient to easily maintain lane cen-
ters. With this configuration, all loops were naviga-
tionally perfect.
5.2.3. NQE: Area B, the “Puzzle”
Area B was the last of the sites in our testing or-
der (Figure 24). This area was very representative
of the final event, with the exception that it had an
abundance of stalled vehicles littering the puzzle-
patterned streets. It was also very similar to the roads
we tested on at El Toro, and hence we expected to per-
form well. To the contrary, we experienced our worst
outings on this portion of the course, with most of our
failures the result of some bewildering hardware fail-
ures, software bugs, and a bit of misfortune. We were
not able to fully complete the mission on either of the
runs and as a result, ended up having scant data to
analyze in order to prepare for the finals. It would
have been greatly beneficial to our team if DARPA
had provided a practice site resembling this area.
On our first attempt at Area B, we chose to navi-
gate using the same sensor set successfully employed
in Area C: GPS waypoint tracking and curb detec-
tion derived from LIDAR. Absent from our sens-
ing suite was the forward-facing radar cluster, as we
had been observing a fair number of false detects
from ground clutter on these radars and we feared
this would be a bigger concern in Area B than in
Areas A and C. It should also be recalled that the
MIT code utilized the raw radar signals, as opposed
to filtered output that normally is exported from the
Delphi production radars. Given that the Velodyne
LIDAR had been reliably detecting all obstacles of in-
terest, this was deemed an acceptable solution. The
vehicle demonstrated the ability to execute parking
maneuvers and navigate around stalled obstacles and
again performed without flaw at intersections and in
the presence of traffic. However, we did experience
occasional issues with the curb detection algorithm
and in some cases missed curbs that existed, resulting
in behaviors such as cutting corners between way-
points. In other cases, we misclassified obstacles that
Figure 24. Site B course RNDF and aerial photo.
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
834 • Journal of Field Robotics—2008
were not curbs as curbs, resulting in fail-safe modes
being invoked, in which case curbs could again be
ignored and similar driving behaviors would result.
After jumping a curb about midway through the
course, the Velodyne process crashed due to the phys-
ical unseating of a memory chip. Presented with no
Velodyne obstacles in the map, the vehicle drifted at
idle speed and was DARPA paused just as it was
about to strike a plastic banner located at the in-
terior of one of the puzzle pieces. Although it is
highly improbable that we would have completed
the course without the Velodyne, had the front radar
been on, we would have likely detected the ban-
ner and stopped. Shortly thereafter, we realigned the
front radars to a higher projection angle above the
ground plane. To preclude the possibility of getting a
false return from an overhead object, such as an over-
pass or low-hanging tree branch, we filtered the data
to reject returns from ranges in excess of ∼20 m.
Our second attempt at Area B came after sitting
for 7 h in the sun on one of the hottest days of the
event. We were scheduled to begin promptly at 0700;
however, at each of the areas where we were tested,
we were continually leapfrogged in the schedule by
other teams in the field. Given that this was our last
run before the finals, we decided to run all sensors
and processes, including the vision lane tracking and
LIDAR curb detection, having felt we had resolved
the conflict between these two processes and want-
ing to acquire a complete data set. Upon launch, the
vehicle proceeded nominally for a few hundred me-
ters and then began to stutter, starting and stopping
abruptly. DARPA immediately halted the test and
sent us back to the start chute for another oppor-
tunity. Upon examining the data logs, it was found
that we were flooding the computer network with
traffic, and as a result navigation and pose messages
were being periodically dropped, causing the stutter-
ing motion observed in the vehicle. We terminated
the lane detection function and relaunched the robot.
It proceeded normally until reaching a stop sign at
an intersection exiting the interior of one of the puz-
zle pieces, and at this location a significant disconti-
nuity in the ground plane was formed by the crown
of the facing road and/or the rain gutter between
the two perpendicular roads. This was perceived to
be a potential curb, causing the planner to keep the
vehicle halted while it attempted to resolve the situ-
ation. After a brief stoppage, the truck idled across
the street and into a lawn. A DARPA pause com-
mand was ineffectual, and we were subsequently dis-
abled. The data logs revealed that the brake controller
module indicated an over-temperature warning and
refused to command brake pressure, which is con-
sistent with the observed behavior with regard to
the DARPA pause vs. disable (which commands the
parking brake) commands.
At least three serious issues were raised from test-
ing in this area:
Vision: Our vehicle employed three cameras, two
forward facing with a combined FOV of ∼100 deg
and one center rearward facing. Although MIT had
significantly more visual coverage, their lane de-
tection algorithm was designed to accept a vari-
able number of camera inputs and had been shown
during testing at El Toro to work acceptably with
our configuration when clear lane markings were
present. However, during the NQE, we were un-
able to demonstrate reliable functionality from the vi-
sion system on our platform, and we are not certain
whether hardware or software contributed to these
shortcomings.
Curb detection: The primary functions of the
LIDARs were to detect obstacles and to determine the
topography of the ground around the vehicle, infor-
mation that was used to determine traversable ter-
rain, as well as to infer the existence of curbs. Gen-
erally speaking, the algorithms that perform these
functions do so by making a comparison of the el-
evation changes or slopes of neighboring map grid
cells. Declaring something an obstacle is much eas-
ier than declaring something a curb, especially in the
case of the F250, where the ground clearance is more
than 0.25 m. On the other hand, curbs are often less
than 0.10 m in height relative to the surrounding ter-
rain. The trick is to tune the thresholds in the software
to maximize detection while minimizing false pos-
itives. An additional complication is that some fea-
tures will correctly trigger a detection, yet not be an
obstacle of concern. Examples of this would include
speed bumps or other ground discontinuities such
as grated sewer covers, rain gutters, etc. At present,
when this type of detection arises, the MIT code relies
on fail-safe modes to make forward progress. Given
additional time to develop more sophisticated algo-
rithms, and given redundant sensing corroboration,
this problem could be addressed in other manners,
but that was beyond the containable scope of the
DUC effort.
Although these false positives were infrequent,
we seemed to be more sensitive to them than
MIT’s LR3, again presumably due to the differences
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between our platforms. Whereas MIT operated far
more LIDARs—which could provide a greater de-
gree of redundancy—we feel that the issue was more
likely related to the fidelity of the LIDAR data. MIT’s
push-broom scanners, produced by SICK, sampled at
1-deg intervals, and their Velodyne, which they op-
erated at 15 Hz, sampled at 0.15-deg intervals. On
the other hand, our push-broom Riegls acquired data
at 0.02-deg intervals, and our Velodyne, rotating at
10 Hz, sampled at 0.09-deg intervals. All things being
equal, our sensing set would be more prone to ele-
vation noise with an algorithm that compares neigh-
boring cells. Once we realized this, we went back
and resimulated all of our prior data sets, tuning the
available parameters until we no longer saw these
false positives. In the process, we recognized that the
Velodyne alone was sufficient to detect curbs, and to
avoid potential noise from the Riegls, we did not in-
corporate them in this algorithm in the UCE.
Brake controls: The IVS vehicle braking system
was implemented by the use of a brake by-wire sys-
tem furnished by TRW, one of Ford’s primary brake
suppliers. A production-level ABS module with the
addition of custom hardware and software modifi-
cations allowed for independent dynamic braking of
each wheel of the vehicle with superior braking accu-
racy and increased braking bandwidth, as compared
with brake pedal displacement devices such as em-
ployed by some of the competing vehicles. This mod-
ule is capable of providing smooth control of vehi-
cle velocities down to 0.5 m/s. Another advantage
of this system is its quick recovery time, which sig-
nificantly enhances safety for development engineers
occupying the vehicle during autonomous test runs.
The main disadvantage of this prototype system was
the inability to hold the vehicle at a complete stop for
more than 10 min. As with all production ABS sys-
tems, the control module’s heat dissipation character-
istics are primarily specified for intermittent use, and
therefore for our application, the continuous braking
utility of the ABS module was limited. To protect the
brake module from potential physical damage un-
der these continuous braking applications, an inter-
nal software integrator timer was employed.
If the brake module actually overheats and/or
the internal software integrator times out, all primary
braking for the IVS vehicle is lost, and the vehicle
would begin to roll at the idle speed of the engine,
with an e-stop pause command being ineffectual. A
similar time-out failure had occurred during the site
visit, and at that time, DARPA suggested shifting
to park position and releasing the brakes during an
extended pause condition. This suggestion was an
idea we had also contemplated but had not yet im-
plemented due to time constraints. Once the site visit
was over, we did follow this approach.
5.2.4. UCE: The Finals
When we started the truck on the morning of the
race, one of the servers was inoperative. After some
inspection, we discovered that the power supply to
this server was not functional, and we had to remove
all the servers in the rack to access it. Fortunately,
we had a spare and reassembled the system just in
time to make it into the queue. While we were go-
ing through our checklist in preparation for the start,
we discovered that the low-level controller was ex-
porting bad data. This was quickly traced to a faulty
connector, which had likely resulted from the pan-
demonium in replacing the power supply. This con-
nection was fixed, and the low-level controller subse-
quently seemed to be behaving correctly. Given that
we were only two vehicles from the starting chute,
and that it takes about 20 min for the INS to stabi-
lize, we opted not to power down and perform a com-
plete reboot of the system. This was a clear mistake,
as corrupt data remained in the system, causing our
steering controller to command a lock left turn upon
launch. We were restaged, and during this time, did
reboot the system from start. The second launch pro-
ceeded with nominal behavior. This incident points
out a clear problem that needs to be resolved before
autonomous systems ever reach production product
viability—as has been shown with numerous other
systems, the customer is unwilling to wait for even a
few seconds after ignition before driving, much less
the minutes it currently takes for computers (and INS
systems) to initialize or reinitialize.
On the basis of the lessons we had learned during
the NQE, we decided to run the UCE with the sim-
plest stable configuration of sensors and algorithms
possible. This consisted of GPS waypoint following,
curb detection using only the Velodyne LIDAR, and
obstacle detection using both LIDAR types and a
small set of Delphi ACC radars, notably including the
front forward unit and the 90-deg intersection scan-
ning units. Because we were somewhat handicapped
by not being able to run the vision system (aside from
data logging purposes), we did insert a limited num-
ber of additional waypoints into the RNDF in regions
we deemed might present issues.
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
836 • Journal of Field Robotics—2008
Figure 25. Incident in which the Cornell team tried to pass into XAV-250’s lane, requiring evasive maneuvering on XAV-
250’s part to avoid collision. The red arrow denotes the Cornell vehicle as seen in the Velodyne point cloud, and the overlaid
camera image to the lower right clearly shows the Cornell team in our lane.
During the time our vehicle was operational, it
navigated well, obeyed the rules of the road, passed
numerous robots and traffic vehicles, displayed cor-
rect intersection logic and traffic precedence, and
successfully demonstrated parking maneuvers. Fur-
thermore, it exhibited intelligent behavior when pre-
sented with the scenario of an oncoming robot ap-
proaching us in the wrong lane, slowing down and
taking evasive actions to avoid a collision (Figure 25).
The failure mode for our vehicle occurred when
we again detected a false positive upon exiting the
interior of one of the puzzle pieces. While at the stop
sign between this small road and the main road, the
curb detection process incorrectly perceived either
the crown in the facing road or the sharp disconti-
nuity formed by the rain gutter to be a potential curb
(Figure 26). Under normal circumstances, the vehicle
would have waited for a short period (nominally 90 s)
and invoked a fail-safe mode, which would have re-
laxed the curb constraint. However, following the dif-
ficulties we had with the topological conundrum in
Area C, the timer for this process had been increased
by an order of magnitude to rigidly enforce curb con-
straints while we evaluated a potential fix for this
issue. Unfortunately, through oversight on our part,
the timer had not been restored to its default value
and we were subsequently and fairly disqualified
for excessive delay on the course. When we rescued
the truck, the planner was indicating a valid path,
waiting for the fail-safe timer to expire. Although we
cannot say what would have happened for the re-
mainder of the course, we do know that this oversight
prevented us from ever finding out.
6. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
AND LESSONS LEARNED
This section presents, in no particular order, a variety
of the remarks contributed by team members during
the writing of the DARPA final report and this ar-
ticle. Whereas these comments obviously pertain to
our perception of the DUC experience, we suspect
that many of these general observations and lessons
learned will be shared by other teams as well.
• We expect that all teams will complain to
some extent about having inadequate devel-
opmental and testing time between the an-
nouncement of the DUC program and the
UCE. It is a very ambitious goal to create a test
vehicle within a year, much less one that au-
tonomously drives itself in simulated urban
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Figure 26. Failure mode of the XAV-250 during the UCE. The red arrow indicates a false detect of an in-path curb at
an intersection. For reference, the white arrow indicates the stop sign in both the Velodyne intensity channel and camera
imagery.
traffic. Complicating the challenge is the large
number of intermediate milestones. Although
we can certainly understand DARPA’s need
to assess interim performance, the Track A
funding proposal, video submission, kick-off
meeting, informal interim reports, technical
paper, site visit, multiple revisions to rules
and procedures, etc., are nevertheless distrac-
tions, especially for teams with few members.
• Many of us felt that the DARPA site visit and
NQE did not adequately represent the final
events at any of the three Grand Challenges.
In some sense they are actually a bit of a
detour—the site visit because it requires an
integrated, fully functional system too early
in the development timeline and the NQE
because it demands performance objectives
that are not actualized again in the finals.
From our discussions with other teams at the
event, we found that a significant number
had designed specifically for the site visit—
often with surrogate platforms, sensors, or
algorithms—knowing in advance that they
would operate different systems if they were
invited to participate at NQE.
• From our perspective, we would encour-
age any potential future event to create
mission goals that are both clearly defined
and realistic. Conversely, we do understand
the opposing perspective, in that specify-
ing requirements too succinctly can result in
less-innovative solutions. Although we felt
DARPA did an excellent job of conveying
goals at this Challenge, we also feel that the
goals were not entirely representative of a
practical mission application. Our assump-
tion is that maps, with ample metadata, will
exist for both automotive and military appli-
cations. Referring back to an example shown
at the Washington briefing, it seems highly
improbable to expect a robot to stop within
1-m registration of a stop line at one inter-
section, when the neighboring intersection is
completely devoid of GPS coordinates and re-
quires the vehicle to execute a 90-deg turn
through it. Corporate entrants, such as IVS,
are driven by a production mindset demand-
ing system reliability, redundancy, and ro-
bustness and as such are already prone to
overdesign for the Challenge, without the
added burden of trying to correctly guess in
advance what the metrics for success will be.
• Similarly, corporate teams are often dis-
advantaged with respect to universities or
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military contractors, wherein the metrics
for success are very different. Universi-
ties can draw upon a vast pool of inex-
pensive, talented, and highly motivated la-
bor, and there is very little downside to
not performing well, as they are, after all,
“just a bunch of students.” On the other
side of the coin, corporate teams must jus-
tify the high costs of (very long-range)
internal research and development and care-
fully weigh the potential rewards vs. the
numerous risks, ranging from liability to neg-
ative publicity. Given that major corporations,
and not universities, are ultimately going to
deliver military and commercial hardware so-
lutions, we would encourage DARPA to con-
sider how to better engage their participation
without making all but the winner appear to
be losers.
• Testing in a realistic environment is abso-
lutely critical to uncovering system weak-
nesses ranging from flaws in logic to bugs in
algorithms. A thousand laps in a parking lot
is no match for a mere few blocks of urban
roadway. Unfortunately, finding safe and se-
cure test facilities requires connections, time,
and money. The IVS team was fortunate to
have tested at more than half a dozen loca-
tions prior to NQE, yet one of our most criti-
cal bugs was not realized until we attempted
Area C. It was difficult to test potential fixes
to this flaw, however, as the practice areas
at NQE did not contain representative fea-
tures of the UCE, one of the very few dis-
appointments we had with DARPA’s execu-
tion of this event. It would have also been
useful if DARPA had allowed teams a cou-
ple of days in which to attempt the courses
after the UCE was complete, so as to close
the loop on the learning process. On the basis
of our mutual testing with MIT prior to the
NQE, we are convinced that if DARPA could
arrange for a common testing venue for all
teams, autonomous ground vehicle technolo-
gies would advance at a much faster pace.
• One of the lessons we learned, and not
necessarily by choice, was that the vehicle
system does not need to be too complex to ac-
complish an amazing amount of autonomous
behaviors. Whereas we did drive several por-
tions of the course with only the INS and
Velodyne LIDAR, we would not necessar-
ily advocate implementing a system with-
out added redundancy. It should further be
noted that we did not even come close to
fully exploiting the capabilities of the LIDAR,
particularly in light of the incomplete de-
velopmental work on the intensity channel
data from the Velodyne HDL-64E. If this
hardware/firmware were reliably function-
ing, one could essentially derive black and
white vision simultaneously from the unit
and apply the wealth of existing image pro-
cessing algorithms to the data to significantly
expand sensing capabilities. We are looking
forward to pursuing this area of research in
the near future.
• When the IVS team initially started testing
the Velodyne LIDAR, we frequently lost GPS
reception and hence the INS pose informa-
tion that was necessary for correcting sen-
sor data in our map. Given our close work-
ing relationship with Velodyne, we were able
to rapidly validate that the HDL-64E was in-
deed generating sufficient EMI to jam the
electronics on our NovAtel GPS receiver. To
solve this, it was deemed necessary to mount
our GPS antennas above the Velodyne and to
use a choke-ring design that minimized mul-
tipath interference from below the antenna
phase center. Without data it is impossible
to prove, but we believe that many of the
difficulties encountered by other teams dur-
ing the prefinal practice sessions were due
to EMI emanating from the many Velodyne
units. There was some anecdotal evidence
that other electronic devices could also inter-
fere with our system, including 802.11 wire-
less communications from laptop computers
in the test vehicle. Although it was not em-
ployed at NQE, our secondary e-stop system
was known to fail if more than one 2.4-GHz
device (hand-held radios) was keyed simulta-
neously, something we actually encountered
during the site visit. In a similar vein, the
hand-held radios used by DARPA during
NQE/UCE were powerful enough to cause
the Velodyne units to drop Ethernet packets.
(This was first observed by Stanford and later
verified in the lab by Velodyne.) If we are to
allow the fate of the vehicle to rely on a stack
of electronics and not a human driver, it is
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clear that more care must be taken in the fu-
ture to properly address EMI issues.
• During our prerace testing, particularly when
we were collaborating with MIT, we came to
appreciate the importance and power of cus-
tomized software toolsets. There were sev-
eral notable tasks that one team or another
could do within minutes, whereas it would
take the other team hours to accomplish. Lots
of time can be expended laying waypoints on
maps, creating RNDFs, or visualizing data,
to cite but a few examples. Perhaps DARPA
could solicit contributions from the partici-
pating teams in this regard and create a public
domain repository of available tools, so that
each subsequent effort is not slowed by these
mundane tasks. On a similar note, we would
like to extend kudos to DARPA for supplying
aerial imagery of the Victorville facility in ad-
vance of NQE and for allowing us to preview
the UCE course prior to race day.
• An inspection of the entrants from the three
Grand Challenges reveals that, with rare ex-
ceptions (most notably the first-generation
Velodyne LIDAR), most of the hardware and
sensors utilized were essentially off-the-shelf
technologies. It is clear that the cutting edge
of autonomous vehicle research really lies in
the algorithms and software architecture. As
such, the customized construction of a by-
wire vehicle platform could be viewed as an
unnecessary distraction, and an interesting
future twist for a DARPA Challenge might be
to outfit each of the teams with an identical
platform and see what they could accomplish
by virtue of innovative software alone. This
places the competitors on even ground and is
somewhat akin to the DARPA PerceptOr pro-
gram. (Of course, this is the converse of what
IVS and MIT did this year, i.e., run common
code on vastly different platforms.) Given the
success of the Gray Team at the last Challenge
and VTU at the DUC (and with some biased
self-promotion), we might suggest the Ford
Hybrid Escape as a platform that is by-wire
capable with minimal modifications.
7. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the successful
operation of an autonomous vehicle capable of safely
maneuvering in simulated urban driving conditions.
Moreover, we have achieved this, to varying degrees
of driving complexity, with the implementation of
two very different computer and software architec-
tures. Our switch to MIT’s architecture, which in-
cluded a substantial amount of hardware reconfig-
uration, was accomplished in a span of less than
2 months and not only demonstrated the versatil-
ity of their code but also our resolve and devo-
tion to completing the mission. Although we have
only partially explored the bounds of what is pos-
sible via autonomous vehicle operations, we have
learned a great deal and have ample reason for op-
timism. Although we have estimated, on the ba-
sis of our performance and that of the other con-
tenders, that the capabilities of present-day robots
are still orders of magnitude inferior to those of hu-
man drivers, we have witnessed a rapid progres-
sion in autonomous technologies, despite the rel-
atively short developmental time afforded to the
teams that participated in the Urban Challenge. As
such, we anticipate that this general trend will con-
tinue and foresee that many of the lessons learned
from this and similar endeavors will soon find their
way into commercially available automotive safety
features.
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